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Abuse of the Pardon Power: A Legal and
Economic Perspective
Jaired Stallard*
I. INTRODUCTION
In light of the recent controversy surrounding former President
Clinton's pardons of Marc Rich and others whom the public perceived
to be "unworthy" of a pardon,' questions arise about the proper scope
and the appropriate use of the pardon power. However, this is not the
first time this power has been questioned and is not likely to be the
last. In recent times, Presidents Ford,2 Carter,3 and George Bush, Sr.4
were all criticized for pardons they granted. Why would a President
grant a controversial pardon during his last days in Washington, when
most Presidents spend time during the last few months in the oval
office trying to solidify the legacy of their presidency? Although this
question is puzzling, an application of economic principles to the deci-
sion making process of a President can shed light on the reasons par-
dons are granted.
The purpose of this article is to use economic principles to analyze
the use of the pardon power. Economic models that illustrate the
preferences of a President highlight the situations in which a President
* J.D./M.B.A. from DePaul University, Summer 2002.
1. Many different forms of pardons and derivatives of the pardon power have been granted
including general pardons, conditional pardons, and amnesties. The purpose of this paper is to
describe why the President decides to grant a pardon, in any of its many forms. An explanation
of the history and use of each of these different pardons is beyond the scope of this article.
2. See James Warren, Nixon's Hoffa pardon Has an Odor, CHI. TRIB., April 8, 2001, § 2, at 3.
Warren states that the pardon granted by Nixon to Hoffa was "heavily influenced by self-serving
: . . political considerations involving his [Nixon's] 1972 re-election campaign." Id. For more
information on the facts of the Hoffa pardon see Leonard Boudin, The Presidential Pardons of
James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon Power been Ex-
ceeded?, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21-34 (1976).
3. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power from
the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569, 617 (1991). President Ford's pardon of Nixon is agreed to be a
contributing factor in Ford's 1976 Presidential Election defeat. Ford's approval rating was 66%
before the pardon of Nixon and 50% following the pardon. See Boudin supra note 2, at 2 n. 9.
4. See Walsh Soldiers On, TiME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 15. Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh
stated that the granting of six pardons to individuals involved in the Iran-Contra Affair were
politically motivated, prevented Bush from testifying as a witness in the trials of the individuals,
and was a "grave disservice" to the country. Id.
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is most likely to abuse this power and can aide lawmakers in re-
forming the unchecked power to pardon.
In order to apply economic principles to the pardon power, a num-
ber of issues must be examined. First, it is necessary to analyze the
pardon power itself, and the appropriate uses of this executive power
as outlined by the framers and the judiciary.5 This analysis establishes
the appropriate uses of the pardon power.
The next step is to analyze the traditional economic principles used
to interpret political actions; a disciple referred to as Public Choice.6
The economic tools used to interpret the use of the pardon power are
defined in this step.
In order to understand the benefits that a President gains from issu-
ing a pardon, a paradigm within Public Choice, called rent-seeking,
has emerged to explain transfers of wealth between individuals
through political means, and is helpful in determining why pardons
have been granted. 7 This paradigm has been applied to Congressmen
and is instructive on the reasons pardons are granted.8
After exploring these areas, and with the use of basic economic
principles, models can be generated to explain the number of pardons
granted, the costs and benefits associated with the grant of a pardon,
and the incentives for a President to grant a pardon.9
The models then can be used to explain why a President grants par-
dons and can be used to predict when any pardon, even a controver-
sial pardon, may be granted.'0 The economic analysis of the pardon
power will highlight the current problems of this unchecked power,
and possible reforms will be addressed."
II. BACKGROUND
In order to conduct an analysis of the presidential pardon power
and consequently, its effect on society and the economy, one must first
acquire an understanding of the power itself. Part A provides a his-
5. See infra notes 122 -533 and accompanying text (providing background information on the
subject of pardon power).
6. See infra notes 544 -67 and accompanying text (setting forth background information on
public choice).
7. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text (discussing rent-seeking).
8. See infra notes 800-1033 and accompanying text (examining Congressional implications of
rent-seeking).
9. See infra notes 1044-1500 and accompanying text (analyzing the following three economic
models: "Societal Demand for Pardons Model," "Demand for Services of a President After Ser-
vice in Office Model" and "Maximizing Profits by Selling Pardons Model").
10. See infra notes 1511-1633 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 1644-1833 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility for reform).
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torical background of the pardon power. Part B examines the theory
of 'Public Choice'. Part C focuses on a particular concept of Public
Choice known as 'rent-seeking'. Part D concludes with a recognition
of the congressional implications that 'rent-seeking' creates.
A. Pardon Power
Before applying economic principles to the presidential pardon
power, the basis of the demand for pardons must be determined. A
historical analysis of the rationale for pardons, the early use of the
power, and the public policy allowing great deference to the president
must be explored in order to understand how the societal demand for
pardons is determined. Furthermore, the role of the judiciary in de-
fining the scope of this power must be discussed.
At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the founders con-
templated what role the pardon power would play in America.12 Both
the Virginia and New Jersey Plans, which are considered the major
plans of the convention, omitted the power of pardon.' 3 Surprisingly,
the pardon power was not hotly debated. There is only evidence of a
few verbal exchanges and a couple of motions filed in the debate sur-
rounding pardons. a4 The bulk of the discussion surrounding this sec-
tion of the proposed Constitution focused on the appropriate branch
to delegate the power and the possible limitations of it.15
Alexander Hamilton 16 and James Iredell' 7 were avid supporters of
the pardon power and fought for the inclusion of this power in the
Constitution. Hamilton initially proposed that the chief executive
"have the power of pardoning all offenses except Treason; which he
12. See infra notes 16-255 and accompanying text. Shortly after the Revolutionary War, dele-
gates from each colony assembled to form a "more perfect union." The Convention in Philadel-
phia was not the first to discuss a national constitution, however, the work of the men at this
convention resulted in the modern day Constitution of the United States. Id.
13. See William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 475, 501 (1977).
14. See Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-
Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 786 (1996).
15. See Robert Nida & Rebecca L Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 205 (1999).
16. See JAMES FARRAD, FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEs 29 (1951).
Hamilton represented the state of New York at the Convention and is credited for inspiring the
eventual president, George Washington, to attend. Hamilton was appointed by Washington to
be the Secretary of Treasury and was intimately involved in halting the Whiskey Rebellion, the
source of the first presidential pardons. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
17. See CLINTON ROssITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 303 (1966). Iredell was selected
to be one of six delegates from North Carolina. All of the delegates from North Carolina were
reluctant to sign the Constitution but were eventually persuaded to sign in 1789. Iredell served
in the newly formed government as a Supreme Court Justice. Id.
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shall not pardon without the approbation or rejection of the
Senate."18
The Report of the Committee of Detail 19 agreed with Hamilton that
the President should possess this power but changed the text, reflect-
ing the language of the pardon provision in the Act of Settlement of
1701,20 which stated that the President could grant pardons except in
the case of impeachment. 21 Both Roger Sherman22 and Luther Mar-
tin 23 introduced motions to limit the power, but were rejected. 24 With
little opposition, Article II, Section 2 was passed, stating the President
"shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences
against the United States, expect in Cases of Impeachment. '25
Hamilton and Iredell's defense of this provision prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution is instructive on the intent of the framers and
on how the demand for pardons was created. Hamilton reasoned that,
"a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, in delicate
conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against
the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body" and that
18. See, Kobil, supra note 3, at 590 (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 20-23 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
19. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 192 (1966). The Committee of Detail
was set up in July of 1787 to put the "suggestions, amendments and propositions [of the conven-
tion] into a workable agreement. The Committee was composed of five elected delegates and
were given eleven days to compose a revised version of the Virginia Plan." Id.
20. See Kalt, supra note 144, at 784 n. 40.
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cl. l(stating that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.") Id.
22. See FARRAD, supra note 16 at 34. Sherman was one of the delegates from Connecticut
and served as the mayor of New Haven. He was one of the oldest delegates, 61, and had signed
the Declaration of Independence. Although Sherman opposed many of the provisions of the
Constitution, most notably the Bill of Rights, he eventually signed. Id.
23. Id. at 36. Martin represented Maryland at the convention and had a reputation of being a
committed anti-nationalist because of his devotion to the sovereignty of his state. See also
Bowen, supra note 19, at 293. Martin refused to sign the Constitution. He stated that Maryland
considered "the proposed form of government very defective, and that the liberty and happiness
of the people will be endangered if the system not be greatly changed and altered." Id.
24. See Dunker, supra note 13, at 501. Roger Shaman introduced a motion to limit the pardon
power "to grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of
the Senate" but this was rejected because it was feared that this would give the Senate too much
power. Luther Martin also wanted to limit the power by inserting the words "after conviction"
following "reprieves and pardons." This motion was withdrawn when it was noted that a pardon
before a conviction might be needed in the special case of obtaining the testimony of accom-
plices. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cl. 1.
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"in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical mo-
ments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels
may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth. ' 26 The timing of
pardoning seemed to be a very important factor for Hamilton. He
reasoned that one man can certainly come to a decision quicker than a
group of people, such as the legislative branch, and he believed this
could be very crucial, particularly in a time of uprising. 27 From this
statement, it is clear Hamilton believed uniting the country in times of
hostility was the most important use of the power. 28
Iredell concurred with Hamilton and believed that uniting the coun-
try was a proper application of this power, but he also expressed the
need for pardon power to create flexibility in the criminal justice sys-
tem. He stated that, "it will often happen in every country that men
are obnoxious to a lawful conviction, who yet are entitled, from some
favorable circumstances in their case, to be merciful interposition in
their favor."'29 This rationale for pardoning was based on the assump-
tion that the judicial branch may have, from time to time, excessively
punished those convicted of a crime.
The founders included the pardon power in the Constitution be-
cause they believed there was a societal demand. Society, as a whole,
would be better off if the President was allowed to pardon individuals
to quell uprisings in a timely fashion and to remedy excessive punish-
ment imposed by the judiciary. The founders' faulty assumption, how-
ever, was that the President would only use the power for the society
as a whole, and not for individual self-maximization. 30
The early use of the pardon power reflected the founders' intent. In
1795, President George Washington granted pardons to many of those
involved in the Whiskey Rebellion. 31 Similarly, President Adams
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTIED STATES 350 (1968).
30. Id. Iredell stated that he "entirely lay out of consideration of the probability of a man
honored in such a manner by his country, risking ... the damnation of his fame to all future
ages." Id. See also Hamilton, supra note 26. Hamilton described the pardon power had as a
"benign prerogative." Id.
31. See STEVE BOYD, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 1-7
(1985). In 1791 a tax was levied on the production of whiskey to help pay off the nation's war
debt. This tax was place on producers and was collected prior to realization of profit in the
market place, severally hindering the financial positions of the farmers who produced the whis-
key. In July of 1794, John Neville, an inspector for the Western Region of Pennsylvania, was
attacked and his home was torched and burned. A few weeks after the attack, 7,000 farmers
marched through the streets of Pittsburgh protesting the tax. President Washington was forced
to call upon 15.000 militiamen to quell the rebellion. The soldiers marched west; however, few
20021
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pardoned persons involved in an uprising in Pennsylvania. 32 In 1800,
however, scholars believe the first pardons were given for personal
benefit of the President. The Jeffersonian Republicans were defeated
in the presidential election and just before leaving office, Jefferson
pardoned all persons sentenced and convicted under the Alien and
Sedition Act (the "Act"). 33 The Federalists had used this Act, in vio-
lation of the First Amendment, to silence the Republicans. Although
this seemingly was a permissible use to "unite the country," Jefferson
did not object to prosecution of Federalist judges, editors, and pub-
lishers for libeling the United States and Jefferson. 34 This fact could
verify that Jefferson's actions were for political rather than societal
reasons.
35
The role of the President, in general, has greatly expanded from the
original ideals of the framers. The founders "assumed that the presi-
dent would be a political eunuch, with the duty of only assuring that
the laws passed by Congress, which is where the political action would
occur, be faithfully executed. ' 36 Since the presidency of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the President has executed powers that the legislative and
judicial branches and possibly even the electorate may have otherwise
rejected. 37 A scholar further stated that "[t]he expansion of presiden-
tial power, and the public acceptance of that expansion, has produced
public expectations that the President will take charge of the most
important issues facing the nation. ' 38
insurgents were found. Only a few rebels were captured and eventually charged and convicted
of treason against the United States. Id.
32. See JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 373-395 (1992). This uprising, referred to as
Fries' Rebellion, stemmed from an increase in taxes on homeowners. Many homeowners re-
fused to pay the taxes and were incarcerated. John Fries led a mob of approximately 150 men to
the Bethlehem jail and freed the evaders. Fries was sentenced to death for his involvement in
the uprising but was pardoned because Adams did not believe Fries sought to overthrow the
government. Id.
33. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 115-116
(1994). The Alien and Sedition Act were actually composed of four different acts. The Alien
Act contained three different acts: 1) The Naturalization Act, which raised the residency require-
ment for citizens from five to fourteen years; 2) The Alien Enemies Act, which empowered a
President to banish aliens of enemy countries during war times; and 3) The Alien Friends Act,
which authorized the President to deport aliens who where dangerous to the peace and safety of
the United States. The Sedition Act mad it criminally punishable to publish "any false, scandal-
ous and malicious writing." Id.
34. See LENARD LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 163 (1963).
35. Id.
36. See Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, White House Scandals and the Presidential
Pardon Power: Persistent Risks and Prospects for Reform, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 907, 912 (1999)
37. ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE, 99
(1981)
38. Id.
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The effect this has on the societal demand for the pardon power is
substantial. 39 Due to the fact that the public believes the actions of
the president take into account "the most important issues facing the
nation," 40 great deference is given to presidential decisions regarding
the granting of pardons. The exclusive power to grant pardons, cou-
pled with the public's great deference of presidential decisions, creates
a large area for possible abuse by the chief executive.
Judicial interpretation has played an important role in the develop-
ment of the pardon power. The Supreme Court first looked at the
pardon power in United States v. Wilson.41 Chief Justice Marshall de-
fined a pardon as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power en-
trusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he committed." 42
After the Civil War, President Lincoln issued pardons to those who
fought against the Union. 43 Although it was not necessary, Congress
passed a statute authorizing President Lincoln's use of the pardon
power.44 A few years later, when the Johnson administration 45 began
issuing more conditional pardons, Congress sought to restrict the par-
don power through legislation. 46 They believed President Johnson
was abusing his power and repealed the statue.47 The judiciary was
called upon to determine if Congress could limit the President's use of
the pardon power.
In Ex parte Garland, the Supreme Court upheld the President's un-
conditional power to grant pardons.48 Speaking for the Court, Justice
39. See infra notes 10808-1411 and accompanying text (analyzing the "Societal Demand for
Pardons Model").
40. See supra note 37, at 99.
41. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) (holding that the pardon was not
applicable to the present conviction of the defendant because it was not brought judicially before
the court by motion or plea; thus, the trial court was unable to take judicial notice of it).
42. Id. at 160.
43. See Kobil, supra note 3, at 593 n. 148. The pardons granted by Lincoln were conditional;
those who were granted pardons were required to pledge their allegiance to the Union.
44. See id. at 593 n.149; see also Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 13, 12 Stat. 589, 592, repealed
by Act of Jan. 21, 1867, ch. 8, 14 Stat. 377 ("[Tlhe President is hereby authorized, at any time
hereafter, by proclamation, to extend to person who may have participated in the existing rebel-
lion in any State or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such time and
on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare.").
45. Id. at 593.
46. Id. at 593 n.151. See Act of Jan. 21, 1867, ch. 8, 14 Stat. 377. The Act attempted to limit
the power of the President by repealing Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 13, 12 Stat. 589, 592. The
1867 Act became law without President Johnson's signature.
47. See Kobil, supra note 3, at 593.
48. In Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 370-71 (1866) (granting petitioner's prayer;
thus relieving petitioner of all penalties attached to the pardoned offense).
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Fields stated the power is "unlimited, with the exception stated," and
"extends to every offense known to the law."'49 Furthermore, "[t]his
power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress
can neither limit the effects of his pardon, nor exclude from its exer-
cise any class of offenders." 50 In later cases, the Court further defined
the scope of the pardon power.51
In Bibble v. Perovich, the Court recognized the intent of the foun-
ders when it outlined the basis for the pardon power. 52 It stated that a
pardon is granted when, "it is the determination of the ultimate au-
thority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less
than what the judgment fixed."'53 The judiciary, concurring with the
beliefs of the founders and the electorate's acceptance of the use of
the power, certified the societal demand for pardons.
The President's power to regulate imprisoned individuals was certi-
fied, however many questions remain unanswered. What is the appro-
priate number of pardons a President should grant? What are the
societal costs of issuing a shortage or surplus number of pardons?
What are the effects of societal costs on a president's decision to grant
a pardon? What are the effects of compensation given to a President
in exchange for the issuance of a pardon? Economic principles can be
used to help answer these questions.
B. Public Choice
This section will give a general overview of the theory of Public
Choice including the foundation and definition of this field, the gen-
eral assumptions made by this theory, and the major assumption made
about politicians within Public Choice.
Public Choice is a relatively new discipline that combines various
academic fields, including political science, philosophy, and econom-
ics. 54 Consequently, the definition of this discipline is still in flux. Ap-
plications of Public Choice have been explained with regard to either
49. Id. at 370.
50. Id.
51. U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,142 (1872) (holding that the President could grant
conditional amnesties); Osborn v. U.S., 91 U.S. 474 (1875) (holding the pardon power included
the power to remit fines and forfeitures); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 98 (1925) (holding the
pardon power extends to criminal contempt of court).
52. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 485 (1927)
53. Id.
54. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRO-
DUCTION 6-7 (1991).
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the "Virginia School" 55 or the "Chicago School" 56 and scholars within
the field have debated the proper scope of this discipline. The entire
field, however, can be traced to the early works of Gordon Tulock57
and James Buchanan58 who refused to accept the principle 59 that po-
litical actors, such as voters, members of political parties, and elected
representatives, base their decisions solely on the benefit of society as
a whole.60 The most simplistic definition of Public Choice is "the eco-
nomic study of non-market decision making, or simply the application
of economics to political science."'61
The theory of Public Choice is grounded in the assumption that
there exists a political market in which political actors seek to maxi-
mize their own utility.62 An individual's own economic well-being is
the essential element in determining what decisions political actors
will make. By applying this concept to political actions, the Public
Choice theory attempts to describe the outcomes of political actions in
55. See Dennis Muller, The Virginia School and Public Choice in THE PUBLIC CHOICE AP-
PROACH TO POLITICS, 431-442 (1993) (differentiating the "Virginia School" from other schools of
Public Choice because it not only sought to explain why political institutions produce undesir-
able results but also expanded the Public Choice field by describing how the institutions can be
redesigned to produce better results). Id.
56. Id. at 432. Muller describes the "Chicago School" as willing to "extend the rational man
assumption, as in rational expectations models, to the point where man is not only capable of
behaving consistently when making choices, but possesses the powers bordering on clairvoy-
ance." This school only seeks to explain why unfavorable results occur in political institutions.
Id.
57. See Gordon L. Brady & Robert D. Tollison, Introduction to IN ON THE TRAIL OF HoMo
ECONOMICUS: ESSAYS BY GORDON TULLOCK (Gordon L. Brady & Robert D. Tollison eds.
1994). Tullock was a co-founder of Public Choice Society, served as President of the Society, and
has contributed over 140 articles and 15 books in economics and political science. Id. at viii, 4-5.
58. See FARBER AND FRICKEY, supra note 54 at 1. Buchanan was also a co-founder of the
Public Choice Society. He brought the theory of Public Choice to the forefront when he was
awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1986. Id. See also Charles K. Rowley, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT IN DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC CHOICE 42-60 (1987). Rowley discusses Calculus of
Consent, the article cited as Buchanan's most important contribution when he was awarded the
Nobel Prize.
59. See FARBER AND FRICKEY, supra note 54 at 44.The principle that politicians seek the
public good stems from the Republicanism paradigm. In modern Republicanism theory, citizens
"put aside their own interests and enter a public-spirited dialogue about the common good." Id.
For a summary of modern republicanism see Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
60. DAVID B. JOHNSON, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, at 11 (1991)
61. DENNIS MULLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1 (1989).
62. W. MARK CRAIN & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, Introduction to PREDICTING POLITICS: ESSAYS
IN EMPIRICAL PUBLIC CHOICE, at 5 (W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollision eds. 1990).
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terms of individual self-maximization. In addition, this theory seeks
to create usable economic models to predict political outcomes.63
Although this may be thought of as a very "crude" interpretation of
our political system because the individual is portrayed as self-maxi-
mizing and not acting for the good of the society as a whole, Public
Choice theorists highlight Adam Smith's interpretation of the role of
self-maximization in the private market. 64 Smith's idea was that, "in-
dividuals motivated by self-interest and guided by private market re-
straints tend to promote the general welfare even though they do not
intend to do so and are often unaware that their actions are promoting
the public interest. ' 65 Analogizing this theory of the private market
to the political market, it may be better for society if individuals were
to act in the political sphere with the same self-interest as they display
in the private realm.
A major assumption of the Public Choice theory, regarding the self-
maximization of those elected to public office, is that individuals seek
to remain in office indefinitely and therefore act in a way that will
increase their probability of being re-elected. 66 Since elected officials
seek the rewards of public office, the self-maximizing incumbent will
continue to act in a way that will maximize his duration in office.67
C. Rent-Seeking
One of the most popular areas of Public Choice literature focuses
on the paradigm known as rent-seeking. Economists have discussed
the concepts of rents in many different forms 68 and have generally
63. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SO-
CIAL CHOICE 17 (1982). The theory of Public Choice has been attacked because it has been
unable to account for many common political actions, most notably the concept of voting. Be-
cause of the large number of votes cast in an election, it is unlikely that a single vote will deter-
mine the outcome of the election. If the individual is self-maximizing, he will become a free-
rider and not vote because of the opportunity costs associated with taking the time to vote. Yet
millions of people still vote. In addition, the more a voter is educated, the more likely he or she
is to vote. Theorists have written off the Public Choice Theory, stating that if it can not predict
individuals desire to cast votes, how can it predict how the individual will vote. Id.
64. See generally, ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS. Adam Smith is known as the
"Father of Economics."
65. See JOHNSON, supra note 60 at 12.
66. CRAIN & TOLLISON, supra note 62 at 13. See Richard E. Wagner, Boom and Bust: The
Political Economy of Economic Disorder, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II, 240-243 (1984).
Wagner describes polices used by incumbents to assist in re-election bids. See also DAVID R.
MATHEW, AMERICA'S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON THROUGH
NEWT GINGRICH, 3-28 (2000).
67. Id.
68. Robert D. Tollison, Is the Theory of Rent-Seeking Here to Stay in DEMOCRACY AND PUB-
LIC CHOICE 144. (Charles Rowley ed. 1989). Other types of rents that have been discussed
include quasi-rents, monopoly rents, and inframarginal rents. Id.
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defined a rent as "a return to a resource owner in excess of the
owner's opportunity cost." 69 Rent-seeking applies the theory of rents
to the political market, and is defined as the individual's use of gov-
ernmental institutions to transfer wealth to themselves through legis-
lation, regulation, and special benefits. 70 Individuals, often special
interest groups, demand the rent and the political actors, who are in
the position to provide the special benefits, are willing to supply the
transfer of wealth for a certain price.71
Rent-seeking occurs because of the societal demand for the govern-
mental institutions to create rules.72 However, if society limits the ar-
eas in which governmental institutions regulate, rent-seeking could
not take place in those areas. A societal demand for pardons must be
established in order for the President to engage in rent-seeking. In
addition, the executive branch must be the governmental institution
delegated as the appropriate branch to execute the power.
Public Choice theorists are mostly concerned with the costs associ-
ated with rent-seeking.73 As a result of rent-seeking, resources are
taken from productive activities in order to acquire privileged posi-
tions.74 In addition, once the position is gained, extra resources are
spent to keep the position; this is often referred to as "rent protec-
tion. '75 The most common explanation of this phenomenon is illus-
trated by applying it to a monopoly situation. The social cost of a
monopoly in the rent-seeking paradigm may include what was com-
monly perceived to be the transfer from the society to the monopo-
69. Id.
70. See Tollison, supra note 68, at 144. But see Douglas C. North, Rent-Seeking and the New
Institutional Economics in DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC CHOICE 163 (Charles Rowley ed 1989).
North states modem rent-seeking analysis is deficient because it looks only at human behavior
and not the institutional framework. He believes that the emphasis "should not be on the
unique behavioral pattern of actors, but on the institutional structure that makes such activity
profitable." Id.
71. An example of rent-seeking in the political market is when a corporation pays a "rent" to
Congressmen in the form of financial campaign contributions, and in return, the corporation
demands favorable legislation for them individually or the industry in general.
72. For example, if Congress was unable to create laws that effect a certain industry, such as
the oil industry, it is unlikely that corporations within that industry would spend money on cam-
paign contributions because they would not reap the benefits of favorable legislation.
73. See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, W.
ECON. J., 224-232 (June 1967); Gordon Tullock, Rent-seeking as a Negative-Sum Game, IN TO-
WARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 16-36 (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock eds.
1980).
74. In the campaign contribution example, resources are taken away from researching, mar-
keting, or other productive activities and are given to lawmakers in order to buy legislation.
75. See Tollison, supra note 68 at 149.
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list.76 One scholar wrote that, "[r]esources will therefore flow into the
activity of getting the monopoly and will continue their flow until the
present discounted value of the resource investment equals the pre-
sent discounted value of the monopoly. 77
According to some theorists, the two "basic presumptions of rent-
seeking theory are (1) that the expenditure of resources to gain a
transfer is itself a social cost and that (2) the resulting market privi-
leges or rent represent a welfare loss on consumers and taxpayers. '78
The variety of ways rent-seeking takes place includes, "sale of subsi-
dies, tax privileges, price supports, tariffs, farm or import quotas, or
licenses to the highest bidder." 79 These rather covert ways of granting
rents occur so that the political officials are not under the same level
of public scrutiny as if they blatantly sold monopolist or beneficial
positions.
D. Congressional Implications of Rent-Seeking
The majority of the research conducted in this area has focused on
the lobbying efforts of interest groups, rent seeking, and the willing-
ness of Congress to supply the special benefits. Many interesting Pub-
lic Choice theories have emerged regarding these entities, including
the desire of interest groups for durable legislation.80 The roles of the
executive and judicial branch with regard to durability have been ex-
plored.8' These studies focus on interest group concerns about the
overturning of favorable transfers by future legislation. An interest
group is obviously not going to spend as much money trying to gain
less durable transfers and in fact, will be forced to spend more money
protecting their interest if they gain a short-term transfer.
Many other Public Choice theories have been documented while
studying the rent-seeking paradigm. These studies include the rela-
76. If a corporation was granted a monopoly through Congressional legislation, which re-
sulted in excess profits totaling $20,000,000 a year; the corporation would spend up to that
amount of money per year to keep the monopoly. This would be accomplished by supporting
Congressmen, through campaign contributions, who would vote in favor of the monopoly.
77. GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 98 (1980).
78. William C. Mitchell and Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An
Introductory Survey in 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 525 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Legislation is more durable the longer the duration of the benefit to the rent-seeker. If
Congress was to grant a monopoly'to a corporation for one year, the legislation would not be
durable, and therefore, would not be as valuable as a grant of a monopoly for 20 years.
81. See William Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective in 18 J. L.ECoN. 875-901. Landes and Posner concluded that because the
legislative procedures make the passage of legislation difficult and time consuming, and because
"judges are merely agents of the current legislature," legislation is a fairly durable good. Id.
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tionship between interest groups and the size of government, 82 log-
rolling,83 and the effects of the size of the group seeking rent.84 These
issues, however, are beyond the scope of this article and the focus will
now turn to the studies and conclusions of Glen Parker on rent-seek-
ing and Congress.
Parker outlined the rationale of individuals who seek Congressional
seats, discussed the effect rent-seeking has on the Congress, and intro-
duced a theory on why Congressmen do not adversely impact interest
groups in their final term of office. 85 Parker's analysis was chosen be-
cause it reflects the preferences of long-term Congressman, or in other
words "career politicians. '86 In modern times, the majority of Presi-
dents can be considered "career politicians," so it is likely that they
will have preferences very similar to those of long-term Congressional
officials.
Four basic assumptions about the politician are made in Parker's
analysis of rent-seeking in Congress. First, like all Public Choice mod-
els, he assumes that the individual, in this case the legislator, is a util-
ity-maximizer. 87 Second, he assumes that long service in politics is a
reflection of an individual preference for intrinsic, as opposed to ma-
terial, benefits. 88 The intrinsic returns of a politician may include na-
tional visibility, the power of the position, and the perception of being
a dedicated public servant.89 As Parker noted, it is very difficult to
measure the exact preferences of a legislator because it would not be
beneficial for him to expose a preference that might translate into a
public perception of him as a "power" or "money" hungry individ-
ual. 90 He supported this assumption by showing that a politician ex-
periences great opportunity costs, because compensation awarded in
the public sector is far less than that awarded for a very similar job in
82. See Dennis Mueller and Peter Murell, Interest Groups and the Size of Government, in THE
PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH TO POLITICS, 344-364 (1993). Mueller and Murell concluded, "inter-
est groups are able to influence public politics in a manner as to lead to increased government
size." Id.
83. See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, in THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH TO
POLITICS, 458-459 (Dennis Mueller ed. 1993). Logrolling refers to vote trading to express the
intensity of preferences. Id. For a more detailed explanation of logrolling see JAMES
BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT, 42 (1962).
84. See MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, 48 (1965). Olsen concludes
that small groups are better able to mobilize resources to influence government. Large groups,
on the other hand, must deal with free-rider problems. Id.
85. GLEN PARKER, CONGRESS AND THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, 124-132 (1993)
86. Id.
87. Id. at 37 (defining a utility-maximizer).
88. Id.
89. PARKER, supra note 85, at 37.
90. Id. at 38.
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the private sector.91 In addition, if a legislator were interested only in
monetary gain, their legislative career, due to disclosure regulations,
would be short.
Parker's third assumption is that the value of the intrinsic returns
that come from holding a political office increases with tenure.92 This
assumption is based on the fact that the longer a legislator is in office,
the more notoriety he or she receives on a national level, which might
include being labeled as a dedicated public servant or an expert in a
certain area.93
The fourth and final assumption is that rent-seeking decreases the
intrinsic returns of a legislator.94 This assumption stems from the idea
that as more rent-seeking occurs, politicians are perceived as desiring
only the financial rewards of their position and no longer are con-
cerned with the interest of the public at large.95 Society then looks at
politics and those who engage in political careers negatively. 96 Conse-
quently, those individuals who would desire a political career because
of the intrinsic rewards no longer seek public office, but instead look
to gain these intrinsic rewards in other institutions. This creates a vi-
cious cycle and in the long run, increases rent-seeking activities. 97
Perhaps Parker's most interesting finding was that final term legisla-
tors did not participate in maximization of monetary returns, even
when there was no expectation of future intrinsic returns. 98 This
seems counter-intuitive considering the assumption that individuals
are self-maximizing. However, he found that career politicians place
great value on their reputations. This can be explained by the large
sunk costs of career politicians, opportunity costs and the costs of be-
ing reelected are substantial. Upon exiting public service, the reputa-
tion of the individual is part of the intrinsic rewards of being a career
politician. In addition, politicians who are perceived as having a 'ster-
91. Id. at 39. See also Louis Lavelle, The Gravy Train is Slowing, Bus. WK., Apr. 2, 2001, at 44
(reporting that the five highest paid CEO's each make over 100 million dollars annually while
the chief executive of the United States only makes $400,000 annually).
92. See id.
93. PARKER, supra note 85, at 39.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See PARKER, supra note 85 at 80. See also Amihai Glazer, On the Incentives to Establish
and Play Political Rent-Seeking, in 75 PUBLIC CHOICE 139-148 (1993) (stating that "when one
candidate is expected to consider campaign contributions when he awards contracts, whereas the
other candidate promises to avoid rent-seeking, then the latter candidate will receive no contri-
butions, and will lose the election. The result holds even though the firms prefer that there be no
rent-seeking.") Id.
98. See PARKER, supra note 855 at 82.
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ling reputation' will benefit financially after they leave office, because
many politicians do not totally retire. They can use their reputation to
solidify a position as a public speaker or can work within an industry
that benefited during their time in political office. As Parker stated,
"[a]s long as retirees value their reputations because of the invest-
ments they have made, and the returns they expect to obtain, last-
period problems should not appear with any regularity." 99
There exists a demand, among special interest groups, for transfers
of wealth and Congress is willing to participate in these transfers
through legislation. The findings of Public Choice theorists in this
arena can be useful in explaining and predicting the possibility of rent-
seeking activities used to ensure presidential pardons. However,
many of the collective action problems of Congress do not apply to
pardons, because of the exclusive power of the President to grant
pardons.100
Before discussing rent-seeking and the application to the pardon
power, it is important to first point out the key difference between the
rent-seeking of the legislative branch and the pardon power. As pre-
viously stated, a concern that interest groups have regarding the seek-
ing of transfers is the durability of the legislation.10 1 Legislation,
although it does not regularly get overturned,102 still has the quality of
being reversed by either the legislatures or the judiciary. The pardon
power, on the other hand, cannot be reversed, 10 3 so that those who are
able to get the transfer through pardons can possess the wealth from
the transfer indefinitely.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Economic Models
The analysis of rent-seeking and the pardon power will need to be
viewed with regard to three different models. The first model will de-
termine the number of pardons that society demands and the effect of
oversupplying or undersupplying by the President.10 4 The second
model will illustrate the societal demand for the services of the Presi-
99. Id.
100. Article II, Section II, Clause I of the Constitution grants the President the right to grant
pardons. See infra notes 46 - 79 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 800.
102. See Landes & Posner, supra note 81.
103. See supra notes 48-533 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 10808-1411 and accompanying text (analyzing the "Societal Demand for
Pardons Model" in relation to the number of pardons demanded by society and the resulting
effects of over or undersupplying by the President).
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dent after he leaves the oval office. 105 The third model will show the
profits that the President can gain if he "sells" pardons. 106 These
models are interrelated and will be discussed together in conjunction
with Parker's assumptions. 107
B. Societal Demand for Pardons Model
As previously stated, the rationale for pardons is to "unite the coun-
try" and to serve as a check on the judiciary branch.' 08 The appropri-
ate number of pardons to be granted is, therefore, the number of
pardons that would successfully accomplish these objectives.10 9 This
model does not specifically address each individual whom is granted a
pardon; rather it discusses the individuals in the aggregate, as a quan-
tity. The outcomes predicted by this model assume that the President
only grants pardons for the reasons outlined by the framers. How-
ever, because of the great deference that the public gives to the Presi-
dent, 10 it is likely that pardons are granted for other reasons.
The exact demand for pardons during a specific period is very diffi-
cult to determine because information pertaining to individual prefer-
ences for the use of the pardon power to serve as a check on the
judiciary, or to "unite" the country, is not readily available. The ac-
tual demand function for the number of acceptable pardons that may
be granted can only be realized after the President supplies the par-
dons and the public reacts to the use of the power. When deciding
how many pardons to grant, the President must make an educated
guess on the societal demand for pardons ("D,").111 The societal de-
mand function for pardons will be rather normal, meaning neither ex-
tremely elastic nor inelastic.112 This is grounded in the assumption
that society will be willing to accept a small number of pardons, if the
105. See infra notes 1422-14646 and accompanying text (using the "Demand for Services of a
President After Serving in Office Model" to show the societal demand for the President's ser-
vices once he leaves the oval office; focusing on the monetary returns the President can expect to
receive).
106. See infra notes 14747-1500 and accompanying text (examining the "Maximizing Profits
by Selling Pardons Model" in relation to the amount of profits the President is able to gain upon
sale of pardons).
107. See supra notes 28-300 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. The effects of granting a favorable or unfavorable pardon that is outside the scope of two
previously stated rationales for granting pardons will be discussed in the application of the
models.
110. See DAHL, supra note 37.
111. The societal demand for pardons is labeled D, in Figures 1, 2, and 3.
112. Where the demand is neither extremely elastic nor inelastic, the slope of the societal
demand curve will not be extremely high or low.
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price to society is high, and a larger number of pardons if the price to
society is low.
The President will also take into consideration the marginal cost of
supplying pardons. Marginal cost is defined as the cost of producing
one extra unit of output.113 When the pardon power was initially es-
tablished, the marginal cost looked like a classic marginal cost, u-
shaped, curve. 114 The reason it was u-shaped is because of the "set
up" cost of putting the power in place. This included the cost to soci-
ety of spending time on creating the power, as well as the administra-
tive and procedural costs.
Today, however, the marginal cost curve is more linear, because the
costs associated with the time spent establishing the power are
sunken.115 The marginal cost of the President ("MCp") is equal to the
cost to the society, plus the opportunity cost of the President him-
self.1 16 The cost to society will be equal to the opportunity cost of
having the President partake in other presidential activities. Flowing
from Parker's second assumption,11 7 the President's opportunity cost
is equal to the losses he endures as a result of spending time issuing
pardons, rather than taking other actions that would increase his in-
trinsic returns.
The marginal societal cost ("MSC") is also an important factor.'1 8
Marginal societal cost is defined as the total cost to society of produc-
ing an additional unit of output,119 in this case a pardon. This is com-
puted by adding the marginal private cost, MCp, to the costs involved
in the production of the good.' 20 The marginal societal cost takes into
consideration the cost of having a President spend time granting par-
dons, instead of participating in other actions that are of "national
importance"; however, it would include the opportunity cost of the
President. Therefore, although the opportunity cost of the President
will fluctuate, the MCp would be greater than the MSC.
113. S. CHARLES MAURICE & OWEN R. PHILLIPS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: THEORY AND APPLI-
CATION, 93-95 (1986).
114. The curve is u-shaped because of the initial set-up cost. For example the cost of produc-
ing the first automobile in a factory is very high because it takes into consideration the cost of
the factory, employees, etc. As more cars are produced the cost of the production of each car is
reduced and the curve begins to have a positive slope.
115. The initial set-up, in this case the cost of setting up the government is sunken. The Presi-
dent does not have to set up the governmental structure and create the pardon power before he
issues each pardon.
116. The marginal cost of the President is illustrated in Figures 1, 2, and 3, and labeled MCP.
117. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
118. Marginal societal cost is represented as MSC in Figures 1, 2, and 3.
119. KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS, G-8 (1999).
120. Id.
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In order to gauge the value of the MSC, the existence of a negative
or positive externality must also be explored. An externality exists
when "the actions or decisions of one person or group impose a cost
or bestow a benefit on second or third parties. ' 121 If a negative exter-
nality is present, the MSC will shift upward because an additional cost
is levied upon the public.'22 On the other hand, if a positive external-
ity is present, the MSC will shift downward because the public is be-
stowed a benefit. 123 The value of an externality is very difficult to
calculate, however, it is likely to result in the production of too many,
or too few, units. 24
In the case of a pardon, the transaction occurs between the Presi-
dent and the individual whom is granted the pardon; society is a third
party to the transaction. Society, as a whole, is better off if the Presi-
dent is able to grant pardons, because this check on the judiciary12 5
and the ability to quell rebellions 2 6 reassures and strengthens the
public's view of our system of government; similar to the effect of pos-
sessing a strong military defense.12 7 This "feeling," created by the par-
don power, is a by-product of the actual issuing of pardons and results
in a positive externality, so that MSC is lower than the marginal pri-
vate cost of the President. 28
If the President correctly determines the demand for pardons, he
will supply the quantity of pardons equal to the place where MCp in-
tersects the demand curve, a point that is above the MSC. 129 The
value of P2130 minus P1,131 which is equal to the distance between
points A and B in Figure 1, is the value of the positive externality
created by issuing Q1 number of pardons. Since the value of the exter-
nality is difficult to calculate, the President will not grant an efficient
121. Id. at G-4.
122. Id. at 375-378.
123. CASE & FAIR, supra note 119, at 375-78.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 28-300 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. CASE & FAIR, supra note 119, at 387
128. Id. at 376.
129. The President does have a monopoly over the pardon power; however, his marginal reve-
nue created by issuing pardons is equal to the demand of society. This results because the Presi-
dent is a "career politician" and values the intrinsic reward of a good reputation. If he issues too
many or too few pardons, with respect to the societal demand, his reputation will fall. In addi-
tion, as will be explained in Figure 4, the monetary rewards of post-office employment will be
affected by the decrease in reputation.
130. P, measures the cost to society of issuing pardons where the MSC intercepts the demand
curve.
131. P2 measures the cost to society of issuing pardons where the MSp intercepts the demand
curve.
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number of pardons. If this value could be determined, the President
would grant the number of pardons equal to the point where MSC
intersects the demand curve, point C in Figure 1.
Figure #1
Societal
Costs
P 2
P
Quantity of Pardons
Figure #2
Societal
Costs
P 2P1
P3
XMCP
7 MSC
P 1-P 2=PE
Quantity of Pardons
From period to period, the demand for pardons will likely shift in or
out, depending on public perception of the need for pardons.132 These
shifts are illustrated in Figure 2. If the demand shifts out from D, to
D., the quantity supplied will increase from Q1 to Q2, and the cost to
society will also increase from P1 to P2. A likely cause of this demand
shift would be a perceived harshness of the judicial branch. 133 More
132. This is based on the assumption that the demand for pardons is based on the public's
opinion and the acceptable uses of the pardon power outlined by the framers and the judiciary.
133. See supra notes 28-300 and accompanying text. The framer's intended for the pardon
power to be used in this type of situation. Id.
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people would demand pardons to remedy the excessive punishments
given and the President would then respond through the issuance of
more pardons.
There is also the possibility of a decrease in the demand for par-
dons, which would result in the exact inverse of an increase in the
demand. This is illustrated in Figure 2, with an inward shift of the
demand curve from Ds to Di. The number of pardons granted would
be reduced from Q to Q3, and the societal cost would decrease from
P1 to P3. A possible cause of this decrease would be public opinion
that the President was abusing his power, or public contentment with
the actions of the judiciary. 134 The President would respond by issu-
ing fewer pardons.
It is not likely that the President will guess the exact quantity of
pardons demanded by the public.135 The demand may be overesti-
mated and result in more pardons than demanded, which is repre-
sented by point A on Figure 2. The President estimated a demand of
Do and the actual demand is Ds. The cost to society of this error is the
difference between P, and P2. The President may also underestimate
the demand, represented in Figure 2 by the shift from Di to D,. Point
B represents the number of pardons granted due to this estimation.
The cost to society of this underestimation is the difference between
P, and P3. Note that the cost to society of either a small over or under
estimation is still less than the value of the positive externality that is
created, which is the distance between points C and D.
The utility-maximizing President 136 will attempt to accurately assess
the demand, because a failure to do so will result in a negative reputa-
tion. 137 If there is a gross misunderstanding of societal demand, the
President will be seen as improperly executing his official duties. Due
to the fact that the President values the intrinsic rewards of political
office, 138 he will seek the most accurate assessment of the demand. A
small misunderstanding of the demand, however, will not cause major
harm to the reputation of the President; a direct result of the great
deference given to the President.' 39 Since he is seen as taking actions
that are in the best interests of the country, 40 a small surplus or
134. Id.
135. Currently there is no public survey on each application for pardon that is reviewed by the
President.
136. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
137. This negative reputation would be based upon the public's perception that the President
was abusing his power.
138. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
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shortage of pardons granted will not have an adverse effect on his
reputation.
Even with the deference given to the President, a great disparity in
the quantity demanded will likely have a negative effect on the repu-
tation of the President. There is a demand for pardons, so issuing too
many or too few, will prompt the public to question the President's
actions and will taint their view that the President is acting with their
best interests in mind. 141
An interesting aspect of this model is that the increase in demand
for pardons causes the pardon power's positive externality to have a
smaller value. As the demand increases, as seen in Figure 3 from Ds
to Dx, the value of the positive externality remains the same, but the
cost to society increases. The distance between P1 and P2 is equal to
the distance between P3 and P 4. P1 is the total cost to society with the
demand of D8, while P3 is the total cost to the society with the demand
of D. Where the demand is lower, Ds, the positive externality, the
distance between P1 and P2, represents a larger portion of the total
cost than when the demand is at Dx. The higher the cost to society,
the lower the percentage the positive externality represents.
Figure #3
Societal MCP
Costs MCS
P3  --------
P4 .. . . .......
P2
LDs Dx
Ql Q2
Quantity of Pardons
This relationship between societal cost and positive externality
makes intuitive sense. The more pardons demanded, the less the soci-
ety believes the system of government is working, so the value of the
pardon power is diminished. The security of having an adequate
141. See supra note 3. President Ford's popularity decreased significantly after pardoning for-
mer President Nixon.
2002]
124 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
check on the judiciary remains the same, but the increase in excessive
punishments creates a proportionately greater uncertainty about the
effectiveness of our government. This also makes sense in terms of
the use of the pardon power to "unite the country.' 42 The more par-
dons demanded for those who were not loyal to the country, or caused
uprisings, would mean there is a question about the foundations on
which the country stands. The positive externality of faith in the sys-
tem would be diminished.
In summation, the total number of pardons that the President
grants can be seen as a function of his own self-benefit.
C. Demand for Services of a President After Serving in
Office Model
The second model is a demand function for the services of the Presi-
dent, after he completes his term in office, and focuses strictly on the
monetary returns he is expected to receive. Similar to congressmen,
the President commonly uses his notoriety to perform services, such as
speaking engagements, in which a fee is paid for the service. Opposed
to congressmen, a former President is less likely to go into the private
sector and work for those groups that benefited from his term in of-
fice. It is important to note that the speaking skills of a former Presi-
dent could increase the demand, however, by virtue of being the
President, there is still a consistent demand for these services.
This function is normal, since the willingness of parties to pay for
the services of the former chief executive decreases as the price of the
service increases, and vice versa. 143 Since the President is self-maxi-
mizing, he will set the price at the point in which he will make the
largest profit.144 If the price is set at Pt, the largest rectangle under
the demand curve is created and the President is therefore making the
largest profit.145
This may not seem to make sense, since the "career politician" val-
ues the intrinsic rewards more than material rewards. A former Presi-
dent, however, has already established his reputation with the label of
being a dedicated public servant. These intrinsic rewards, especially if
the President continues to be active in the public sector, cannot be
taken away from the President after he leaves office, barring a major
scandal. He has maximized his intrinsic rewards, and as a utility maxi-
142. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
143. This function is represented in Figure 4 as Dave.
144. This price is represented by P1 in Figure 4 and is the profit maximizing point.
145. The profit realized by the President is calculated by multiplying price by quantity and is
maximized at Point Pi.
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mizer, he would desire to maximize his material rewards. This follows
the same reasoning as to why a congressman would not participate in
actions that might adversely affect interest groups that he had
aided.146 Maximizing material rewards by securing future earnings
would be expected from a self-interested individual.
D. Maximizing Profits by Selling Pardons Model
The third model represents the profit that a President could receive
if pardons were sold to the highest bidder. The demand curve is again
normal, so that as the price of a pardon decreases the number of those
willing to buy a pardon increases. 147 Due to the lack of checks on the
pardon power, 148 the President could set a price for pardons that
would maximize his profits. This price would be at the point where
the x-axis meets the demand curve to form the largest rectangle
box.149 The quantity supplied,150 would be at the point where the larg-
est rectangle box that could be drawn would meet the y-axis.
Note that this situation does not take into consideration the willing-
ness of those to pay for the refusal of a pardon, such as a victim's
family. The President would be better off if he sold the rights to issue
a pardon. This would be done on an individual basis, so the true pref-
erences of the individuals would be displayed and the President would
gain financially from it. In this situation, the President could capture
146. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
147. This is illustrated in Figure 5 as Dpardon.
148. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
149. This is represented at P in Figure 5.
150. The quantity supplies is labeled 0 in Figure 5.
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Figure #5
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the entire area under the demand curve. He would obviously be the
individual who would have to issue or refuse to issue the pardon, but
the rights would be very valuable nonetheless.
IV. IMPACT
These three models are intimately related when applying the rent-
seeking paradigm to the pardon power. To illustrate rent-seeking and
the pardon power, three different examples will be used. The first
example will discuss the effects of small surpluses or shortages in par-
dons that the President supplies.' 51 The second example will look at
the effect of the President's reputation when he leaves office.152 The
third example will depict the effect of the term limit on the President,
as opposed to that of Congressmen. 153
As previously stated, small surpluses or shortages will not affect the
President's reputation if the pardons are granted either to unite the
country or to remedy a harsh judicial sentence.154 Therefore, the de-
mand for the service of the President, after he leaves office, will not be
shifted inward or outward. 55 The President will be in a good position
to maximize both the intrinsic rewards of being a President and the
monetary rewards that are realized when the President completes his
term in office. However, society's great deference to the President
may lead to speculative pardons or to the refusal of pardons.
151. See infra notes 154-160 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text (concluding that the utility-maximizing
President will attempt to accurately assess the quantity of pardons demanded by the public to
avoid a possible resulting negative reputation for failing to accurately assess the public's
demand).
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If a limited number of pardons were granted or refused, and the
President gained monetarily from his decisions, it would not be likely
to influence his reputation in a positive or negative manner. In refer-
ring to Figure 2, if C represents the number of pardons demanded,
and the President supplied either A or B number of pardons, there
would be a cost to society, but this value would still be less than the
positive externality created. 156 The President could be paid for the
risk he took for issuing or not issuing a certain number of pardons,
and maximize his material rewards. This, however, assumes that the
general public does not have knowledge of the money supplied to the
President in return for his service. If the public knew he "sold" par-
dons, it would have a negative effect on his reputation, which would
result in a decrease in the demand for his services after he leaves
office. 157
This brings forth an important issue regarding the accessibility of
information. As shown in the Congressional sphere, short terms re-
sult from those who sought monetary rewards, because of disclosure
rules.1 58 The President, however, has a right to withhold certain infor-
mation if it is of national importance.1 59 Obviously a meeting with an
individual about the selling of a pardon is not of national importance,
however, there exists an area in which the President can hide from
public scrutiny and therefore, keep a solid reputation. He will be able
to have both the monetary rewards for granting or limiting pardons
and for his services after office.
The previous example only took into consideration a presidential
pardon based upon a justification of "uniting the country" or provid-
ing a check on the judicial branch. Given the public's deference to the
President, a pardon may be granted that neither of these rationales
can justify. If the public were informed about a pardon that looked
like an abuse of presidential power, the demand for the services of the
President after office would be diminished, and consequently, the fu-
ture monetary returns of the President would also fall. A President
who grants only one pardon too many, but in granting the pardon on
the basis of an unacceptable rationale abused his executive power,
156. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty of granting an
efficient number of pardons, shifts in the demand for pardons, and the societal costs associated
with such shifts).
158. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing how the compensation awarded
in the public sector is much less than the compensation awarded for a similar job in the private
sector).
159. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 36 at 914.
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may suffer a substantial loss in both his intrinsic and monetary returns
of being a politician.160
The reputation of the President is an important factor in determin-
ing if he is likely to participate in rent-seeking, because his reputation
has a direct correlation to the demand for his services after he leaves
office. If the President is held in high-esteem, it is unlikely that he
would participate in rent-seeking. The high public perception may in-
crease his demand for Dave to Dpop in Figure 4, so that the area of
P2BQ 2 minus the area of PtAQ would represent his monetary gain. A
popular President would be risking substantial intrinsic rewards, his
reputation, and monetary rewards, (the decrease in profit after office
resulting from a downward shift of the demand curve) if he were
found to have participated in rent-seeking while executing his pardon
power.
A President's decision to participate in rent-seeking hinges on his
probability of getting caught. If the public discovered that he 'sold'
pardons, his reputation, the intrinsic reward of being President, and
the demand for his services (the monetary rewards), would be dimin-
ished, shifting from Dpop to Dave or even lower. The loss of profits is
illustrated in Figure 4. The President would not be participating in
utility-maximization and therefore, his actions would not conform to
Public Choice.
The number of pardons 'sold' may not have a direct correlation
with the decrease in the reputation of the President. If it was discov-
ered that the President sold ten pardons for one dollar each, the de-
mand for his services after leaving the oval office may decrease
slightly. However, since the value of each pardon is only one dollar,
the pardons would likely be justifiable and the public could accept the
reasons for granting the pardons. On the other hand, if a single par-
don was sold for one million dollars, the demand for the President is
likely to decrease greatly. Since the value of the pardon was very
high, the public will perceive that the President greatly abused his ex-
ecutive powers. The reputation of the President will decrease and
therefore, the demand for his services after office will be reduced.
If a President were viewed poorly, however, a certain level of rent-
seeking may occur. Note that a President 'viewed poorly' could be a
single-term President who was defeated in the election following his
160. See supra notes 1411-1422 and accompanying text (commenting on how issuing too many
pardons will cause the public to question the President's actions as well as taint the public's view
that the President is not keeping the best interest of the public in mind when taking such
actions).
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first term, or a President who is not viewed highly in public opinion
polls.
The reason a President, in this situation, would participate in rent-
seeking is for the exact same reason that a popular President would
not, maximization of both intrinsic and monetary rewards. The intrin-
sic rewards of an unpopular President are significantly smaller than
those of a popular President, because of the diminished reputation.
The diminished reputation may result in a smaller demand for the
services of the President after leaving the oval office. Dunpop in Figure
4 represents the demand for an unpopular President. Since the Presi-
dent was unpopular, he would lose profits equal to rectangle P1AQ1
minus P3 CQ3. The President would desire to recoup the lost benefits
of the smaller demand by 'selling' pardons.
This could occur in two different ways. First, the President could
'sell' a few pardons to the highest bidders, and recoup his monetary
loss from decreased demand. This, however, would decrease his de-
mand even more, because of a decrease in his reputation, which would
result in a further need to sell more pardons. A vicious cycle would be
created.
Another manner, in which a President could recoup the benefits, is
by increasing his popularity and reputation in an effort to shift the
demand for his services. This could be done by granting pardons, not
demanded by the public to be a check on the judiciary or to unite the
country, but popular to the majority of the country. This may include
a pardon to a rock star type figure. This action would be done in
hopes that the pardon would increase the popularity of the President,
and shift his demand outward, to the point where the average presi-
dential demand is located.
A third issue that arises from rent-seeking and the pardon power is
the effect of term limits. The President is limited to two four-year
terms, whereas some Congressmen are able to serve indefinitely. 161
Congressmen in their last term are not likely to act any different to-
ward rent-seekers 162
However, there are some key differences between a former Con-
gressman and a President. First, a Congressman can make a real deci-
sion to retire. A President could also make a decision to retire,
however, his party would view him negatively if he represented their
best chance to win an election. If he represented the party's best
chance to win an election, he was most likely a popular President, and
161. See u.s. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1
162. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
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if he didn't represent their best chance to win, he was likely an unpop-
ular President. A negative reception to his decision to retire would
decrease his demand after office. A President is forced to stay in of-
fice even if he feels his intrinsic rewards are maximized.
Congressmen, as opposed to a President, have more opportunities,
if they are voted out of office or retire, for material and possible fu-
ture intrinsic rewards. Former Congressman can run for another of-
fice, even the presidency, or be placed in cabinet positions by a
President. 163 There is still an area in which the intrinsic rewards of
holding a public office are available. A former President cannot run
for President again, and the intrinsic rewards of holding a lower office
are small.
Since term-limits create fewer material and intrinsic benefits for for-
mer Presidents than for Congressmen, the reputation of a President
will be the most influential determination of whether or not they par-
ticipate in rent seeking.
V. POSSIBILITY FOR REFORM
The perceived abuse of the pardon power 164 has resulted in a call
for reform. The major arguments surrounding pardon reform focus
on preventing presidents from covering up illegal activity and prevent-
ing the possibility of a president pardoning himself. The arguments in
both areas are applicable to rent-seeking because, as illustrated in the
application of the economic models, the president would seek to cover
up his issuance of pardons for a fee, and if it was discovered that he
sold the rights to a pardon, he may try to pardon himself.
After the Watergate scandal, Congress enacted the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act of 1978.165 This act empowered an independent counsel
to investigate and prosecute the misconduct of government officials,
including the President. 166 Since its enactment, only President Carter
was not investigated concerning his issuance of pardons.167 The effec-
tiveness of this act, however, is suspect because of the President's abil-
ity to classify information as 'concerning national importance'-a
President may still be able to hide his own criminality.
163. John Ashcroft, a former Congressman from Missouri was appointed Attorney General
by George W. Bush.
164. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (noting the controversy and criticism associ-
ated with the pardons granted by former Presidents Ford, Carter, George Bush, Sr., and
Clinton).
165. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1982).
166. Id.
167. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 36, 929 n.124.
[Vol. 1:103
PARDON POWER
Since the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress is unable to limit
the pardon power through legislation, 168 a constitutional amendment
would need to be ratified, which can only be initiated by Congress or
by two-thirds of the state legislatures. 169 Although the amendment
process is slow and relatively easy to block,170 the major problem with
pardon power reform is determining what means of limiting the par-
don power should be included in the amendment.
Some scholars, concurring with Martin's motion at the Constitu-
tional Convention, 17' believe that the pardon power should only be
exercised after conviction.' 72 There are two reasons a post-conviction
limitation is believed to be proper. First, a pre-conviction pardon
would hinder and undermine the judicial system. As one scholar
stated, "a pardon should not be granted until the courts have tried to
achieve justice and have failed."'1 73 In addition, "a pardon is often
granted to adjust a sentence... [and] until [it] is passed, no one knows
what adjustment needs to be made."'1 74
The second rationale for a post conviction limitation is to prevent
the president from issuing pardons to influence testimony and conceal
misconduct. President George Bush, Sr. allegedly pardoned individu-
als in the Iran-Contra Affair to prevent exposure of his own miscon-
duct. 175 If trials were required, a full investigation of the allegations
would take place and if a president were involved in any wrongdoings,
the information would be publicized. 76
There are a number of positive effects stemming from this proposal.
First, because the public, including the media, would be able to scruti-
nize the President's rationale, the number of unjustified pardons
would likely decrease. 77 In addition, if the President issued an in-
defensible pardon, Congress could impose the constitutional sanction
of impeachment. 178
168. See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 370-71 (1866) (upholding the President's
unconditional power to grant pardons).
169. See U.S. CONST., art. V.
170. See Duker, supra note 133, at 537. After President Ford pardoned Nixon, Walter
Mondale (D-Minnesota) proposed a constitutional amendment that would allow Congress to
veto a pardon with a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate. The proposal was never fully
considered.
171. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
172. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 36, at 924-925. See also KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE,
PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 217-225 (1989).
173. See MOORE, supra note 1722, at 218.
174. Id.
175. See Walsh Soldiers On, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
176. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 924.
177. See MOORE, supra note 172, at 220.
178. Id.
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The ability of Congress to impeach a President for abusing his exec-
utive power is the strongest and most used argument of those who
believe the pardon power should not be changed and should remain
just as the founders wrote it. 179 Not only could a President be im-
peached and ousted from office for abusing his power, but could also
be impeached after leaving office and therefore, be stripped of his
pension and entitlements.18 0 The supporters of the current pardon
power point out that two state governors have been impeached fol-
lowing the sale of pardons; James Ferguson of Texas was impeached in
1917 for selling pardons181 and J.C. Walton of Oklahoma was im-
peached in 1923 after he sold pardons to political allies.1 82
The Public Choice Theory, in conjunction with the economic mod-
els, provides an economic perspective of ways to reform the pardon
power. Considering the fact that the President is both an intrinsic and
material reward maximizer, 183 reforms should take place that require
the President to give the public information on his rationale for grant-
ing pardons. If the public knows why the President granted each par-
don, they would take those factors into consideration when forming
an opinion about the President. This opinion would be reflected in
the reputation of the President. Since the reputation of the President
helps determine the demand for his services after he leaves office, he
will have to give solid reasons for granting pardons in order to pre-
serve his reputation. Therefore, the probability of abusing the power
would be reduced. Although the marginal cost of the President will
increase, the positive externality will also increase, because the people
will have an increased faith in our system of government. It is unfor-
tunate that the pardon power has been abused to the extent that a
reform of the pardon power is demanded.
VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over the proper scope of the pardon power has ex-
tended over 225 years. Sherman'8 4 and Martin'- were the first to
challenge the chief executive's sole power to grant pardons. Although
there was little discussion over the proper scope of the pardon power
179. Id.
180. See Kobil, supra note 3, at 779.
181. See Coleen Klasmeir, Towards a New Understanding of Capital Clemency and Procedural
Due Process, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1507, 1535 N.165 (1995).
182. See 3 U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AT'rORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES:
PARDON 150-153 (1939).
183. See supra notes 86 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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at the Constitutional Conventions, 186 the forethought of those two
men is amazing. Today, many are calling for reforms that reflect their
concerns.
The pardon power is being scrutinized again following President
Clinton's questionable pardons in his last days in office. Similar scru-
tiny over the power was discussed following pardons by Presidents
Nixon, Ford, and George Bush, Sr.187 The pardon power is a hot topic,
as it has been in the past, however there has been no change to this
power. It is likely that the pardon power issue will only echo through
the halls of Congress if George W. Bush or his successor issues a ques-
tionable pardon.
This article explored the economic reasons why a President would
issue a pardon and presented different models to help predict the
quantity of pardons a President will issue. The President seeks to
maximize his intrinsic and material reward, and therefore will seek to
issue the number of pardons demanded by the people in order to ei-
ther 'unite' the country or remedy excessive judicial punishment. On
occasion, however, former Presidents have issued questionable par-
dons that do not fit either rationale, as the framers outlined and the
judiciary adopted, and consequently have gained personally from the
decision to grant a pardon. This result is expected because the Presi-
dent seeks to maximize his own utility. The issuance of questionable
pardons is a direct result of the great deference given to the President,
coupled with the natural instincts of the economic man. Pardon
power reform is not likely to occur in the immediate future because of
the amount of time needed to not only pass a constitutional amend-
ment, but more simply, to reach an agreement about the way in which
the pardon power should be reformed.
Even if reforms do not occur, it is likely that the mass media and the
information age will help limit the abuse of the pardon power. The
self-maximizing President will not issue questionable pardons if he be-
lieves the mass media will scrutinize his decisions, because the result
would be a diminished reputation. A decrease in his reputation would
result in fewer material rewards after office. The power of the media
to expose the actions of the President should limit rent-seeking within
the pardon power. If this occurs, the power will remain as "benign" as
Hamilton predicted. 188
186. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text
188. See supra note 30.
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